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1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years mobile telephony has dramatically changed consumersusage of
communication services, as well as altered the historical market structure. Wireless ser-
vices have substantially grown in terms of subscribership, revenues, and usage at the
expenses of xed ones.1 However, recent evidence shows that the majority of users
still prefers to multi-home, i.e. adopt both mobile and xed connections. The associa-
tion of European telecoms regulators (BEREC, 2011) reported that although the share
of mobile-only households increased and that of xed-only households decreased over
time, having both is now the most common situation in Europe and the share of multi-
homers is not declining over time. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer (2014)
"E-communications survey" prepared for the European Commission shows that 61% of
households in the EU27 have both xed and mobile telephone access, around 31% only
have mobile phones and 6% only have a xed phone.2 Interestingly, the rate of mobile-
only households varies considerably across Member States, with values ranging from 85%
in Finland, 83% in the Czech Republic, to 55% in Denmark and 43% in Italy, or to values
below the EU average in countries like Spain (28%), UK (17%), France (13%), Germany
(8%) or Sweden (2%).
The success of the mobile sector is to a large part due to xed-mobile substitution.
Major technological advances and cost reductions have enabled mobile carriers to decrease
the di¤erence between xed and mobile prices, allowing them to become strong competi-
tors to traditional xed providers. Empirical studies have tried to quantify xed-mobile
substitution and its economic impact (see the surveys by Vogelsang, 2010 and 2015), but
there is a lack of theoretical investigation the e¤ect of consumerspreference for mobility
on xed-mobile substitution and on retail call prices. This paper tries to ll this gap and
aims to point out how xed-mobile substitution, and the consumer preference towards
mobility, can distort retail prices of mobile services. This analysis would help policy
makers to understand the e¤ect of xed-mobile substitution on mobile operatorspricing
strategies and to better dene the boundaries between previously separated xed and
1See, for more details, Gruber and Verboven (2001).
2The distribution of di¤erent types of access has changed slightly over the past two years. The
proportion of households with mobile access only has increased by 4 percentage points since 2011 (31%
vs. 27%) while that of households with xed access only has decreased by 3 percentage points. (6% vs.
9%).
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mobile communication markets.
From the theoretical point of view, there exists a relevant - though not large - literature
on the relationship between xed and mobile telephony, with a focus on the role of
xed-to-mobile access (or termination) charges. For example,Wright (2002), Valletti and
Houpis (2005), and Baake and Mitusch (2009) consider xed-to-mobile calls and focus
on the impact of mobile termination charges on retail charges and the number of users.
These papers however do not consider the role of xed-mobile substitution (both at
access and service level), and more importantly, they do not take into account consumer
heterogeneity with respect to the benets for mobility. Moreover, they focus on the e¤ect
of access charges on market equilibria, while our main focus is on retail price distortion.
Armstrong and Wright (2009) also analyze the role of call substitution but their focus
is on the role of voluntary vs. regulated setting of termination rates. These authors show
that direct substitution between xed- and mobile-originated calls weakens the compet-
itive bottleneck of call termination. Hence, the welfare gains from regulating mobile
termination rates are smaller, while private incentives do not imply excessively high lev-
els. Our paper departs from this study by analyzing the more realistic situation where
substitution a¤ects not only the types of calls made but also consumers subscription
decisions, though we do not endogenize the role of the termination charge. Our model
closely considers the suggestion by Armstrong and Wright (2009) who state that "an
alternative kind of substitution between xed and mobile networks may take place at the
subscription level rather than the per-call level, so that some people might give up their
xed line altogether and become mobile-only users." (p. 296).
Our model considers both xed-mobile substitution and elastic subscription demands
on both types of (xed and mobile) networks. In particular, drawing on our previous
paper (Hoernig et al., 2015), we develop a game-theoretic model with three independent
but interconnected operators, one xed and two mobile networks. On the demand side,
all subscribers spend the same fraction of their time outside home, but each of them
has a di¤erent personal benet from having a mobile phone. Depending on their benet
for mobile communications, subscribers choose whether to single-home or to multi-home,
that is, whether to subscribe to a xed or a mobile network, or to both. This implies
that xed and mobile telephony are simultaneously substitutes and complements: They
are complements because even owners of a xed line benet from having a mobile sub-
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scription, by being able to make calls when they are not at home. They are substitutes
because when both networks are available only the cheaper type of call will be used.
This paper di¤ers from our companion paper in two ways. First, the goal of Hoernig et
al. (2015) was to analyze the impact of varying levels of termination rates on consumers
subscription decisions. The key question was whether the di¤erent regulatory treatment
of termination on xed and mobile networks a¤ects the development of xed and mobile
subscription decisions. Our previous ndings show that termination rates have an e¤ect
on subscription substitution and xed disconnection: A higher mobile (xed) termination
rate increases the number of mobile (xed) users and lowers that of xed (mobile) users,
via the waterbed and cost e¤ects, respectively. Higher termination rates also tend to
increase the number of customers who do not adhere to any network, identifying a trade-
o¤ between the uptake of individual networks and total uptake.
The present paper is centered instead on the setting of retail prices, and not on
wholesale prices, and points out the kind of retail level distortions mobile operators could
adopt to gain market share in the presence of xed-mobile substitution. Second, and
more importantly, in this paper we use a more realistic retail pricing structure close to
the one adopted in reality by mobile operators. In particular, we assume that rms adopt
multi-part tari¤s with network-based price discrimination (i.e., call charges depend on
the destination network). For calls only between mobile networks, this pricing scheme
has been already adopted in several other papers, such as La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998),
Gans and King (2001), Cambini and Valletti (2003), Hoernig (2007 and 2014), but none of
these studies takes into account the benet from mobility and the presence of xed-mobile
substitution as we do in this paper.
The focus on xed-mobile substitution is not only theoretically interesting in itself
since it contributes to the previous literature, but it is also founded on the recent empirical
literature. Indeed, recent studies on EU data provide stronger evidence on xed-mobile
call substitution across European countries. Briglauer et al. (2011) nd that, at least
for Austria, xed and mobile calls are strong substitutes while access substitution is
rather weak. Grzybowski (2014) analyzes substitution between access to xed-line and
mobile telephony in the European Union and shows that decreasing prices for mobile
services increases the share of mobile-only households and decreases the share of xed-
only and xed-mobile households, which suggests substitution between xed-line and
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mobile connections. Finally, Grzybowski and Verboven (2014) show that xed and mobile
connections are generally perceived in the EU as substitutes, especially in regions with a
higher GDP per capita, but also that there is a lot of heterogeneity across countries due
to the interplay of specic social and economic features (i.e., households with di¤erent
age, education, professional activity, etc.). However, all these papers do not empirically
consider the presence of network based price discrimination, since they generally consider
an average mobile charge without looking at single price components (i.e. on-net and
o¤-net prices) separately. Hence, this paper also provides new testable predictions for
future empirical work on the impact of xed-mobile substitution on mobile commercial
tari¤s.
Our model predicts that mobile call prices for on-net, o¤-net and mobile-to-xed
calls are all distorted downwards due to substitution possibilities and this distortion is
greater the higher is the xed-mobile termination mark-up. This implies that mobile
networks adapt their pricing structure to compete stronger for mobile-only customers
than for xed-mobile customers. Indeed, our results show that xed-mobile substitution
generates a waterbed e¤ect between xed-to-mobile and mobile-only prots: the higher
prots from xed-to-mobile termination are used to cut mobile-only retail prices and
enhance competition between di¤erent technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we rst lay out the model, and then
discuss the equilibrium tari¤s in Section 3. Finally, we conclude.
2 Model Setup
Consumers and rms. We assume that there are two mobile networks and one inde-
pendent xed network.3 In order to concentrate on the distortions in mobile call prices,
we assume that call prices on the xed network are equal to the corresponding marginal
cost, including termination rates, which tends to result from multi-part tari¤s.
A mass 1 of consumers decides whether to subscribe to a mobile network and/or to the
xed network. According to network choice, we call them mobile-only (M), xed-only (F),
and xed-mobile (FM) subscribers. Consumers spend a fraction of their time  2 (0; 1)
3In a companion paper, Hoernig et al. (2015), we assume uniform pricing on mobile networks and
focus on the e¤ects of termination rates.
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outside home. When on the move, which happens with probability , a consumer can
only use a mobile phone to make or receive calls. When at home the consumer may have
access to a xed and/or a mobile phone; if he has both, he chooses whichever is cheaper
to make calls.
Calling patterns are balanced, and consumers are on the move or at home indepen-
dently of each other.4 They are heterogenous in their xed benet from mobility and,
independently, in their preferences for the two mobile networks, as we will specify below.
We further assume that when consumers choose which network(s) to join, they know
their benets frommobility, but not yet their network preference. For example, consumers
may rst decide whether or not to have a mobile phone and which one (e.g., an iPhone
or an Android phone), and then only decide which mobile operator to subscribe to.5
Mobile operator is numbers of M- and FM-clients are mi and 
mx
i , respectively, for
i = 1; 2. Its total number of subscribers is then i = 
m
i + 
mx
i . The total numbers
of M- and FM-clients are m = m1 + 
m
2 and 
mx = mx1 + 
mx
2 , respectively, the total
number of mobile subscribers is  = m+mx, and there are x xed clients. We assume
that consumers and the mobile operators have rational expectations about the number
of subscribers for each network technology (m, mx and x). That is, they take them as
given when they make their subscription and tari¤ decisions, while in the end their value
must be consistent with the resulting equilibrium tari¤s and subscriber numbers. On the
other hand, mobile operators take into account that their individual market shares mi and
mxi are a¤ected directly by tari¤ decisions, while consumers have rational expectations
mi and 
mx
i .
6 We will of course assume that in equilibrium expectations coincide with
realized values, i.e. mi = 
m
i and 
mx
i = 
mx
i .
Mobile networks incur a xed cost f per subscriber, marginal costs of origination and
termination co and ct, and on-net costs c = co+ct. In order to determine the determinants
of equilibrium prices, we allow for mobile termination rates that depend on the origin
of calls: For mobile-to-mobile calls, it is a = ct + m, and for xed-to-mobile calls it is
afm = ct + n, where m;n  0 are the corresponding termination margins. We will see
4We ignore intertemporal substitution, that is, the possibility for consumers that are on the road to
postpone calls until they arrive at home.
5This timing assumption leads to simple expressions for market shares and keeps the analysis tech-
nically feasible.
6We also analysed the model setup where m, mx and x vary with out-of-equilibrium tari¤s
(rather than only equilibrium tari¤s), and show that the results are qualitatively similar though much
more complicated mathematically.
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below that retail pricing distortions exist if and only if n > 0. Similarly, the xed network
has marginal costs cxo < co and cxt < ct, on-net cost cx = cxo + cxt, and a termination
rate ax = cxt +mx, mx  0.
We make the assumption that the xed-to-mobile termination margin is small, n <
co   cxo.7 As a result, the marginal costs of calls are ordered as follows:
cxo + cxt < co + cxt +mx; (1)
cxo + ct + n < co + ct < co + ct +m:
Tari¤s and surplus. Mobile network i charges a tari¤ (Fi; pi; p^i; pix), where Fi is a
monthly xed fee, and pi, p^i and pix are the mobile-to-mobile on-net, o¤-net and mobile-
to-xed per-minute call prices, respectively. As mentioned above, the xed network
sets call prices equal to their marginal cost, on-net px = cxo + cxt and xed-to-mobile
pxm = cox + afm. We also postulate (and later conrm), that the following ordering of
call prices holds:
px < pix; pxm < pi < p^i, (2)
which implies that mobile calls are only used when no xed phone is available. Note also
that due to (1), this ordering of prices holds when equilibrium prices are close enough to
their respective marginal cost.
The consumption utility from a call of length q is u(q), where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
For price p, the callers indirect utility is v (p) = maxq u(q)   pq, and the call duration
is q =  v0 (p), leading to the obvious short-hands vi = v (pi), v^i = v (p^i), etc. Apart
from the surplus obtained from making calls, subscribers obtain an access benet that
depends on the network(s) they subscribe to. If a consumer subscribes only to a mobile
network or to the xed network, his subscription benet is Am or Ax, respectively. If he
subscribes to both types of networks, he obtains an access benet of Amx.
A mobile-only user makes all calls with his mobile phone and obtains the surplus
wmi = Am   Fi + mi vi + mj v^i + xvix, (3)
7It can be shown that for n > co   cxo the mobile on-net price is not distorted, while qualitatively
similar distortions are found for the mobile o¤-net price and the mobile-to-xed price.
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where ml = 
m
l + 
mx
l denotes the number of receivers on mobile network l = i; j,
ml = 
m
l + 
mx
l the corresponding consumer expectation, and 
x = (1  ) (mx + x)
the number of receivers on xed phones.
Similarly, a xed-only user makes all calls from his xed line, and receives the surplus
wx = Ax   Fx + (1  ) (mvxm + xvx) , (4)
where m = m + mx. For further reference below, also dene  = m + 2mx and
 =
 
=m
   (m=) > 0. Note that xed-only users can only make calls when they
are at home, which occurs with probability 1  .
When an FM-subscriber of network i is on the move, the order of prices (2) implies
that it is cheaper for him to make mobile-to-xed calls than mobile-to-mobile calls when
receivers are at home (pix < pi; p^i). Thus, mobile-to-mobile calls are only made when
receivers are themselves on the move.8 Similarly, when he is at home it is cheaper to use
the xed phone than the mobile phone for any type of calls. We can then express the
expected surplus of FM-subscribers as
wmxi = Amx   Fi   Fx + 

mi vi + 
m
j v^i + 
xvix

+ (1  ) [mvxm + xvx] : (5)
There is substitution to cheaper calls involving the xed network both when callers are
on the road and when they are at home.
Market shares. As already mentioned, consumers di¤er in their preferences for mobile
networks. They learn these preferences after deciding to take up a mobile subscription,
but before choosing a specic mobile network. For the purpose of this paper, we as-
sume that the former decision has already been taken,9 thus we consider the subscriber
numbers m, mx and x as xed, while mobile operators still compete for their share of
consumers. More precisely, we assume that mobile operator is market shares of M- and
8We can imagine that the caller rst calls the receivers xed line, and then calls him on his mobile
if he is not at home.
9This assumption does not a¤ect the analysis of equilibrium call prices. In our companion paper we
endogenize this decision.
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FM-subscribers are given by
mi = y
 
wmi   wmj

m, and mxi = y
 
wmxi   wmxj

mx,
respectively, where y is a function y : R! [0; 1], with y (0) = 1=2, y0 > 0 and y0 (0) =  >
0. An often-used special case is the Hotelling model, which corresponds to y (x) = 1=2+x
(over the relevant range).
Prots. The prots of mobile network i are given by
i = i (Fi   f) + mi [mi (pi   c) qi + mj (p^i   c m) q^i
+x (pix   co   ax) qix + mj mq^j + xnqxm]:
They consist of prots from subscriptions, from calls to other mobile users, from calls to
the xed network, and termination prots from calls arriving from the other mobile and
the xed network.
3 Equilibrium Tari¤s
We now determine the symmetric equilibrium tari¤ (Fi; pi; p^i; pix) of mobile operators as
a Nash equilibrium in their pricing game. The proof of the following Proposition is in
the Appendix.10
Proposition 1 In the symmetric (rational expectations) Nash equilibrium of the mobile
market, we have the following outcomes:
1. Mobile call prices are set below their respective marginal costs if and only if the
xed-to-mobile termination margin is positive (i.e. n > 0),
pi = c+ n (qi=q
0
i) 

p^i = c+m+ n (q^i=q^
0
i) 
;
pix = co + ax + n (qix=q
0
ix) 
;
10We assume the existence of a shared equilibrium. This is ensured as long as  is low enough and a is
close to the marginal transportation cost. The proof of existence would follow the same lines of La¤ont
et al. (1998), as extended to asymmetric settings by de Bijl and Peitz (2002).
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where

 =
xqxm
1= (2)  mq2i =q0i   xq2ix=q0ix
> 0;  =
m + 2mf
m
  
m

> 0;
2. xed fees are equal to
F i = f +
1
2

1  n
m



;
and equilibrium prots are
i =

4
+
(m)2
4

n
 
q^2i =q^
0
i
   q2i =q0i
 +mq^i	 :
Proposition 1 provides interesting and new results. First of all, since q0i,q^
0
i q
0
ix < 0,
all retail prices for on-net, o¤-net and mobile-to-xed calls are distorted downwards.
Interestingly, this distortion applies to all calls in the same direction. Indeed, in the
previous literature on network competition with network based price discrimination (e.g.
La¤ont et al. 1998, Jeon et al. 2004), either all call prices are identical to marginal cost,
or on-net call prices are set below marginal cost and o¤-net call price above.
Second, the retail price distortion is proportional to the mark up on xed-to-mobile
termination charges, n. Indeed, the above conditions show that the distortion disappears
if and only if n = 0, i.e. no prots can be made from terminating xed-mobile calls.
The main intuition of this result is therefore as follows: FM-customers can be reached
on both mobile and xed phones, while M-customers can only be reached on their mobile
phones. This implies that M-customers bring more valuable call termination business.
This in turn leads mobile operators to decrease their own retail prices in order to compete
more ercely for mobile-only customers. Indeed, also the xed fee F i decreases as n
gets larger. A waterbed e¤ect is therefore in place: the prots from xed-to-mobile
termination are moved to decrease retail prices for calls which are proportionally more
used by mobile-only customers.
It is interesting to note that the distortions in all call prices are qualitatively similar.
Letting  = pq0=q denote the respective price elasticity of demand, we have:
pi   c
pi
i =
p^i   c m
p^i
^i =
pix   co   ax
pix
ix = n
:
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This underlines that the same strategic interaction determines the respective (negative)
mark-ups.
The distortion due to xed-mobile substitution depends also on 
. It is interesting
to observe that this factor tends to decrease in , that is, the probability that consumers
are on the move. This implies that the more mobile-only consumers are on the move,
the lower is the distortion in call prices, everything else equal. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to provide a more precise statement without introducing specic assumptions
about the demand function. However, this result holds at least if mobile subscriptions
are su¢ ciently heterogenous (i.e. low ), which magnies the e¤ect of  on  and in turn
on 
.
4 Welfare Considerations
Finally, it is important to consider the potential welfare e¤ects of mobile price distortions
emerging due to xed-to-mobile substitution.
Given that subscriber numbers of di¤erent technologies are xed, the equilibrium
allocation depends only on call quantities. Call prices are below marginal costs including
termination rates, but in the absence of call externalities (see Jeon et al., 2004) welfare
would be maximized with call prices at network marginal cost. From Proposition 1
we observe that on-net prices are always too low, i.e. they are always below network
marginal cost. This implies that too many on-net calls are made. In this setting, a high
termination charge for the xed-to-mobile calls benets mobile users while reducing the
consumer surplus of xed telephony users (although some consumers use the two services).
To restore e¢ ciency, the socially optimal choice would be to reduce the margin for xed-
to-mobile calls to zero, that is set xed-to-mobile termination equal to marginal costs, i.e.
n = 0. With n = 0 on-net price becomes socially optimal while the prices of o¤-net calls
and mobile-to-xed calls would remain above marginal costs as long as m > 0 and ax is
above cost. To further increase social welfare and fully internalize network externalities,
then, the regulator might also set m = 0 and ax at cost. The latter decision, though, is
totally unrelated to the distortion due to xed-mobile substitution we nd in this paper,
since the distortion is only driven by the xed-to-mobile termination mark up n.
In a nutshell, in order to increase welfare and limit the price distortion that emerges
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due to xed-mobile substitution, a possible regulatory intervention would be to move
towards cost-oriented xed-to-mobile termination. This reduction would mostly benet
xed users that will pay less for any xed-to-mobile call; on the contrary, mobile users
will face a reduction of their surplus since they will no longer benet from the "dis-
torted" mobile tari¤s . Further benets may even come from eliminating any mark-ups
from mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-xed termination charges. In this latter case, all
consumers would benet from a complete convergence between xed and mobile calls and
prices will be no longer distorted.
From a technological perspective, the distinction between xed and mobile termina-
tion could also be much reduced in the context of forthcoming NGN/IP-based networks.
In future integrated IP-based mobile and xed networks, marginal costs for terminating
a call will converge on both networks and approach zero. Moreover, voice will represent
only a small fraction of tra¢ c; therefore, total costs will have little to do with minutes
of voice use, but will be much more driven by capacity requirements. The discrepancy
between xed and mobile termination rates appears therefore unjustied in a convergent
market, even though the ratio between mobile (i.e. xed-to-mobile n, and mobile-to-
mobile m) and xed terminations rates has decreased recently. A report by BEREC
(2013) shows that the average termination rate in the EU27 in January 2013 was equal
to 2.58ecents/minute, while the average xed termination rate ranged between 0.50 and
0.80ecents/minute according to the level (layer) of interconnection, still a ratio of 3.1.
Hence, termination on mobile networks, and in particular xed-to-mobile termination
charges, is still at least three times more expensive than on xed networks. Interestingly,
this discrepancy is absent in the US where the ratio between xed and mobile termi-
nation rates is 1:1. Indeed, in the US call termination has a strong tendency toward
symmetry in the rates charged for reciprocal compensation, and the latter are capped at
a rate that reects the marginal cost of the xed termination. In most of the negotiations
mobile-to-mobile termination charges are set to zero (i.e. the so called bill-and-keep;
Marcus, 2004; Vogelsang, 2015). This regulatory intervention might be useful not only to
decrease retail prices overall, but also to avoid call price distortions due to xed-mobile
substitution as we highlight in this paper.
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5 Conclusions
In the last two decades mobile telephony has had a tremendous impact on the xed
telephony market. Due to the benet from mobility, subscribers in many countries now
use their mobiles more than their xed lines, and quite often disconnect the latter. In
this paper, we have presented a model that captures the substitution between xed and
mobile telephony at the subscription and call level, by taking into account consumer
mobility (i.e., the fact that consumers are sometimes at home, and sometimes on the
road). The main insight of the paper is that in a context of subscription substitution
mobile networks distort downwards call prices for on-net, o¤net and mobile-to-xed calls.
This distortion is greater the higher is the xed-to-mobile termination mark-up. The
intuition of this result is that mobile operators want to cut the retail prices of mobile-only
users in order to attract a larger fraction of them, because this type of consumers generates
more termination revenues than the consumers that use both mobile and xed telephony.
Thus, mobile networks adjust their retail prices and the xed component of the tari¤
to compete stronger for mobile-only customers than for xed-mobile customers. This is
an instance of the waterbed e¤ect, since the prots from xed-to-mobile termination are
moved to decrease retail prices for calls, which are proportionally more used by mobile-
only customers.
This paper provides interesting ndings to evaluate the regulatory design of mobile-to-
mobile and xed-to-mobile termination rates over the last 20 years. Clearly, in the near
future, the technological change towards all-IP networks will modify the scenario of the
current analysis. It should lead to termination charges close to or at zero for both mobile
and xed networks. This model does not encompass such a setting but presents a kind of
backward-looking analysis that is useful to highlight the impact that termination charges
had, and still continue to have, on the phenomenon of xed-to-mobile substitution. In
the future, it seems likely that competition dynamics will be shaped by bundle o¤ers
with a reduced importance of paid-for voice calls (and thus weaker network e¤ects at the
operator level); substitution between xed and mobile subscriptions will then mainly be
driven by broadband quality.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Take operator js tari¤ as given. Mobile operator is prots
are i = iT1 + 
m
i T2 with T1 = Fi   f and
T2 = 
m
i (pi   c) qi + mj (p^i   c m) q^i + x (pix   co   ax) qix + mj mq^j + xnqxm:
15
The following derivatives are needed below, all originating from ki = y
 
wki   wkj

k, for
j 6= i and k 2 fm;mxg and given consumer expectations mi and mj :
@mi
@Fi
=  m; @
m
i
@pi
=  mmi qi;
@mi
@p^i
=  mmj q^i;
@mi
@pix
=  mxqix;
@mxi
@Fi
=  mx; @
mx
i
@pi
=  mxmi qi;
@mxi
@p^i
=  mxmj q^i;
@mxi
@pix
=  mxxqix:
Thus, with m = m + mx,  = m + 2mx, we have:
@i
@Fi
=  ; @i
@pi
=  mmi qi;
@i
@p^i
=  mmj q^i;
@i
@pix
=  mxqix;
@mi
@Fi
=  m; @
m
i
@pi
=  mi qi;
@mi
@p^i
=  mj q^i;
@mi
@pix
=  xqix;
The rst-order condition for prot maximization with respect to the xed fee is
0 =
@i
@Fi
=
@i
@Fi
T1+i1+
@mi
@Fi
T2+
m
i

@mi
@Fi
(pi   c) qi +
@mj
@Fi
(p^i   c m) q^i +
@mj
@Fi
mq^j

:
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, this condition becomes
0 = T1   1
2
+
m

T2 +
mm
2
f(pi   c) qi   (p^i   c m) q^i  mq^ig ; (6)
from which we obtain a preliminary form of equilibrium prots,
i =
T1 + 
mT2
2
=

4
  (
m)2
4
f(pi   c) qi   (p^i   c m) q^i  mq^ig :
For the on-net price pi, we have the rst-order condition
0 =
@i
@pi
=
@i
@pi
T1 +
@mi
@pi
T2 + 
m
i

@mi
@pi
(pi   c) qi + mi qi + mi (pi   c) q0i
+
@mj
@pi
(p^i   c m) q^i +
@mj
@pi
mq^j

;
or, with symmetry and fullled expectations,
0 = T1   1
2
+

m
T2 +

2

(pi   c) qi   pi   c
qi=q0i
  (p^i   c m) q^i  mq^j

: (7)
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For the o¤-net price p^i, we have the rst-order condition
0 =
@i
@p^i
=
@i
@p^i
T1 +
@mi
@p^i
T2 + 
m
i

@mi
@p^i
(pi   c) qi +
@mj
@p^i
(p^i   c m) q^i
+ mj q^i + 
m
j (p^i   c m) q^0i +
@mj
@p^i
mq^j

;
or, with symmetry and fullled expectations,
0 = T1   1
2
+

m
T2 +

2

(pi   c) qi   (p^i   c m) q^i   p^i   c m
q^i=q^0i
 mq^j

: (8)
For the mobile-to-xed price pix we have the rst-order condition
0 =
@i
@pix
=
@i
@pix
T1 +
@mi
@pix
T2 + 
m
i

@mi
@pix
(pi   c) qi +
@mj
@pix
(p^i   c m) q^i + xqix
+ x (pix   co   ax) q0ix +
@mj
@pix
mq^j

;
or, with symmetry and fullled expectations,
0 = T1   1
2
+

m
T2 +

2

(pi   c) qi   (p^i   c m) q^i   pix   co   ax
qix=q0ix
 mq^j

: (9)
Combining (7), (8) and (9) with the rst-order condition for the xed fee (6) and the
above expression for T2 leads to the system
0 = m (pi   c) qi + x (pix   co   ax) qix + xnqxm   pi   c
2qi=q0i
;
0 = m (pi   c) qi + x (pix   co   ax) qix + xnqxm   p^i   c m
2q^i=q^0i
;
0 = m (pi   c) qi + x (pix   co   ax) qix + xnqxm   pix   co   ax
2qix=q0ix
;
which is recursive in the second equation. Solving the rst and third one rst leads to
equilibrium call prices
pi = c+ n (qi=q
0
i) 
; p^

i = c+m+ n (q^i=q^
0
i) 
; p

ix = co + ax + n (qix=q
0
ix) 
;
with

 =
xqxm
1= (2)  mq2i =q0i   xq2ix=q0ix
:
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From (6) the xed fee becomes
F i = f +
1
2
  
m


T2 +
m
2
f(pi   c) qi   (p^i   c m) q^i  mq^ig

= f +
1
2

1  n
m



;
and prots are
i =

4
+
(m)2
4

n
 
q^2i =q^
0
i
   q2i =q0i
 +mq^i	 :
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